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Reconciling Newton’s empirical method of natural philosophy with his proposal of absolute space has 
been no easy task for historians and philosophers of science. A cursory glance at some remarks from the 
Principia makes the tension clear. In the General Scholium, which was added to the second 1713 edition, 
Newton explicitly claims that his ‘experimental philosophy’ is premised on the rejection of ‘hypotheses’ 
that are not grounded on sensory evidence (cf. Newton 1999, 943) and, in the Scholium to the 
Definitions, he makes equally clear that his system of mechanics – a system that purports to offer the 
true system of the world – requires appeal to ‘absolutes’, such as absolute space and time, that are not 
accessible to the senses (cf. ibid, 410-4).   
 
Recently, commentators have turned to Newton’s short tract De Gravitatione for clues as to how this 
tension might be resolved. For instance, in his ‘Newtonian Space-Time’ (1967), Howard Stein draws our 
attention to Newton’s De Gravitatione argument against Cartesian relative motion as an avenue for 
understanding the role of space in Newton’s mechanics. According to Stein’s account, what De 
Gravitatione reveals is that Newton proposed the notion of space that he did precisely because he was 
trying to improve upon the failings of Cartesian mechanics and offer a notion of space that would allow 
us to make sense of the natural motions that are confirmed by empirical evidence. Stein brings this 
account to bear on the absolute space of the Principia and urges us to treat absolute space as an entity 
‘deduced from the phenomena’ in the same sophisticated manner that Newton ‘deduces’ universal 
gravitation. As a result, we gain from Stein a portrait of absolute space according to which it is 
demanded by the evidence and thus, according to which this non-sensible space stands as a legitimately 
empirical component of Newton’s experimental philosophy.  
 
Andrew Janiak (2008) has recently offered a worthy challenge to Stein’s account. While he doesn’t 
discount the importance of attending to the anti-Cartesian stance Newton adopts in De Gravitatione, 
Janiak lays greater emphasis on the differences between the unpublished tract and what we find in the 
Principia. He claims in particular that, while the project of the Principia is to clarify the relationship 
between absolute and relative spaces and offer a definition of space that provides a way of clearly 
defining absolute motion, the project of De Gravitatione is one of ontology. By attending to this 
difference, and specifically, to Newton’s claim in De Gravitatione that space is ‘not absolute in itself’ but 
is rather an ‘emanative effect of God’, Janiak contends that what the short unpublished work reveals is 
that Newton’s empiricism is grounded upon and shaped by his commitment to a ‘divine metaphysics’, 
i.e., ‘a fundamental conception of God’s nature and relation to the natural world that is not subject to 
revision’ (cf. Janiak 2008, 44-5).  
 
My goal in this paper is to try to reconcile the different approaches that Stein and Janiak take to De 
Gravitatione precisely by attending to a feature of the text that they do not consider: the strategy 
Newton employs to establish the fundamental features of space, including its status as an ‘emanative 
effect of God’ (Newton 2004, 21). What I emphasize is that, according to Newton, it is a demand of our 
thinking that space exists and exists as an emanative effect of God (i.e., of an eternal and immutable 
being) insofar as these features of space are revealed by ‘the exceptionally clear idea we all have of 
space’ (ibid, 22). As I also claim, this apparently Cartesian (or ‘rationalist’) strategy does not discount a 
thoroughly empiricist reading of Newton’s view of space (as offered by Stein), for as also revealed in De 
Gravitatione, the very idea of space from which its necessary features flow is an idea gained ‘by 
abstracting the dispositions and properties of a body’ (ibid, 22). As such, what emerges as foundational 
for Newton is not a peculiar conception of God’s relationship to space, but rather, a commitment to the 
neatness of fit between the information we gain from our senses and the actual, natural state of affairs. 
If Janiak is thus right to say that there is an unrevisable ‘divine metaphysics’ that shapes Newton’s 
investigation into nature, the argument for space in De Gravitatione reveals that what is most 
fundamental is Newton’s commitment to a view of God’s creation that preserves the epistemically 
privileged place that humans have in nature – a commitment that brings Newton closer to Descartes 
than the text might first suggest.  
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